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COOKING UP A NEW LEMON TEST: THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, DISPLAYS OF
RELIGIOUS OBJECTS, AND LESSONS FROM
INDIA
Christopher J. Heaney*
A foreign tourist visiting a public high school in Giles Country,
Virginia, might wonder why the Ten Commandments are on the school's
wall, next to "the Declaration of Independence, the Star-Spangled
Banner, and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom."' If the
foreigner is a practicing Jew or Christian, she might be offended by the
2
commandments' proximity to less momentous documents. Visitors,
whether Jewish, Christian, or atheistic, might wonder why the words of
Thomas Jefferson and the Abrahamic deity merit similar treatment. The
display might seem especially bizarre if the tourist knew that the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits any
"law respecting an establishment of religion."4 The tourist might think-
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1. Groups Sue Giles County School Board Over Ten Commandments Display
in School, ACLU OF VIRGINIA (Sept. 13, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://acluva.org/7834/
groups-sue-giles-county-school-board-over-ten-commandments-display-in-
school/.
2. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 868 (2005); Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 872-73.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause applies to state
governments. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (citing
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). For a discussion of how religious
displays on government property also raise questions under the free speech clause of
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as this Note argues-that courts hearing challenges to Ten
Commandments displays ought to presume that the displays are
impermissibly religious and that a student's perspective ought to govern
6Ten Commandments displays in public schools.
The hypothetical tourist's confusion reflects two important
issues. First, even if she read case law and scholarly commentary
carefully, she could not be sure what the Establishment Clause means for
government actions that might support religion. A stone monolith
engraved with the Ten Commandments and placed on government-
the first amendment, including public forum doctrine and government speech, see
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). Those issues are outside the
scope of this Note. See also B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context:
A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 538 (2005)
[hereinafter Putting Religious Symbolism in Context].
5. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2193, 2206 (2008) [hereinafter Church and State]; B.
Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change
in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L. J. 705, 724 n.85, 769 (2010) [hereinafter
Ceremonial Deism]; Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 539;
William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 549 (1986).
6. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)
("Regardless of the listener's support for, or objection to, the message, an objective
Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame
prayer as stamped with her school's seal of approval." (emphasis added)); Marshall,
supra note 5, at 541-44.
7. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 ("In each case, the
inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed. . . . The
[Establishment] Clause erects a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."' (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971))); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that "our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray"); Putting Religious
Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 492 ("The treatment of Establishment Clause
challenges to displays of religious symbolism by the Supreme Court and the lower
courts is notoriously unpredictable . . .. A number of commentators have suggested
that this disarray can be blamed largely on the chaotic state of the Supreme Court's
Religion Clauses doctrine." (footnotes omitted)); Marshall, supra note 5, at 495
("From the outset it has been painfully clear that logical consistency and
establishment clause jurisprudence were to have little in common."); Mark Tushnet,
The Constitution of Religion, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 701, 702 (1986) ("Contemporary
constitutional law just does not know how to handle problems of religion.").
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owned land near the Texas Capitol was found constitutional in Van
Orden v. Perry,' but in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky9 a framed print of the Commandments hanging on a
county courthouse wall was found unconstitutional.' 0 Yet a government-
erected cr6che commemorating the birth of Jesus can be constitutional
under the Establishment Clause," at least if the nativity scene is
presented in recognition "of a significant historical religious event"l and
in a way that "engenders a friendly community spirit of goodwill in
keeping with the season."' 3 A Roman Catholic group cannot put a creche
in a county courthouse,14 but a Jewish group might be able to place a
menorah outside of a public building.'5 In addition to confusion over
which objects can be displayed, there is uncertainty over what test will
control. Given the state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a
district court judge analyzing a display of potentially religious objects on
8. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681-82 (2005) (plurality opinion)
(deciding the constitutionality of government-owned stone monolith located on
government-owned park next to Texas Capitol building and engraved with the Ten
Commandments).
9. 545 U.S. 844, 855, 881 (2005) (upholding preliminary injunction against
county courthouse's "The Foundations of American Law and Government Display,"
including the Ten Commandments and historical documents such as the Magna
Carta, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights).
10. Id. at 881.
11. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
12. Id. at 680.
13. Id. at 685.
14. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989).
15. See id. at 620-21 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
16. Compare, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality
opinion) ("Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of
passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our
analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation's history."),
with McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005) ("[T]he Counties
ask us to abandon Lemon's purpose test, or at least to truncate any enquiry into
purpose here. . . . The assertions [made in support of abandoning the test] are as
seismic as they are unconvincing."). See also Marshall, supra note 5, at 497 ("At
times the Court has described the [Lemon] test as a helpful signpost, at other times
the Court has suggested that it can be discarded in certain circumstances, at still
other times the Court has held that it must be rigorously applied." (footnotes
omitted)).
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government property could be pardoned for feeling as confused as a
tourist seeing the Ten Commandments on a school wall.' 7
The tourist's confusion points to a second issue. How can courts
decide whether the government is sending an unacceptably religious
message by displaying objects?' Even if courts know what test to use,
they have to define religion and decide whose perspective counts.19 The
Supreme Court has struggled to do so,20 leading Justice William Brennan
to worry that "analysis under the Establishment Clause look[s] more like
an exam in Art 101 than an inquiry into constitutional law." 2 1 The jibe
captured the Court's fact-heavy analysis of possibly impermissible
holiday displays in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union,22 which considered whether a menorah made a Christmas tree
send a religious message, or a Christmas tree made a menorah send a
secular message.23 The Court's inability to enter such factual morasses
and emerge with consistent results and doctrine suggests that the Court's
current approach to defining religion and that which is religious is
24insufficient for Establishment Clause purposes.
American judges are not the only ones who have struggled to
decide what is and is not religious, and how government may act in the
25 . 26
religious sphere. India has faced similar questions, which have an
17. See supra notes 7, 16.
18. Compare, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) ("The creche
in the display depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized
as a National Holiday."), with id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the
history of such practices or the setting in which the city's creche is presented
obscures or diminishes the plain fact that Pawtucket's action amounts to an
impermissible governmental endorsement of a particular faith.").
19. See Marshall, supra note 5, at 511-12, 533-35. The problem of defining
religion generally is beyond the scope of this Note. See Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers,
97 VA. L. REv. 1111, 1130-40 (2011).
20. See Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 493.
21. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 643 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 573 (majority opinion).
23. See id. at 617 (Blackmun, J., opinion).
24. See Ceremonialism Deism, supra note 5, at 727; Hill, Putting Religious
Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 545; Marshall, supra note 5, at 495-96.
25. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 885-86 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting differences in American and European church-state
relationships); GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA'S
562 [Vol. 10
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added saliency because of recent, deadly violence between various
religious communities during and after India's independence from
British rule in 1947.27 According to the Indian Constitution, "all persons
are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess, practise and propagate religion."28 Yet India's Constitution
explicitly characterizes India as a "secular democratic republic." 2 9 There
are numerous other references to religion in the Constitution. 30 As
SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 8-11 (2003) (justifying
comparative study of the relationship between religion and the state in India, Israel,
and the United States).
26. For examples of the problems that the Indian Supreme Court has
confronted, see Upendra Baxi, Siting Secularism in the Uniform Civil Code: A
"Riddle Wrapped Inside an Enigma "?, in THE CRISIS OF SECULARISM IN INDIA 267,
268 n.1 (2007).
27. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 5; SUGATA BOSE & AYESHA JALAL,
MODERN SOUTH ASIA: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICAL ECONOMY 157-62 (2nd ed.
2004) (noting that partition included "an orgy of murder, rape and plunder on an
unprecedented scale" and was justified in part by appeals to religious communities);
PETER VAN DER VEER, RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM: HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN INDIA 23-
24 (1994) (relating inter-religious violence in India to attempts to define religion in
India and the state's role in it). As important as this history is, it should not be
considered "as [an] effect . . . of the persistence of premodern religious passions and
fanaticism." THOMAS BLOM HANSEN, THE SAFFRON WAVE: DEMOCRACY AND HINDU
NATIONALISM IN MODERN INDIA 10 (1999). Nor should it be considered only the
result of nineteenth century British intervention in India. See VAN DER VEER, supra,
at 19-20. For better or worse, religious nationalism in India is a phenomenon in
which Indians, as well as former colonial rulers, have participated. See HANSEN,
supra, at 11, 18-24.
28. INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 1.
29. Id. at Pmbl., amended by The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment)
Act, 1976.
30. See S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 2000 (listing
provisions of the Constitution of India concerned with religion, including the
Preamble and Articles 14-16, 25-26, 29-30, and 51A). Secularization and religion
in India has generated voluminous writing, which is beyond the scope of this Note to
address more generally. See, e.g., Ronojoy Sen, Legalizing Religion: The Indian
Supreme Court and Secularism 3-5 (East-West Center, Policy Studies 30, 2007),
available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/PSO30.pdf; VAN
DER VEER, supra note 27, at 12-13; Rajeev Bhargava, Introduction, in SECULARISM
AND ITS CRITICS 1, 1-28 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998) (providing a brief overview of
the field); Anuradha Dingwaney Needham & Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, Introduction,
in THE CRISIS OF SECULARISM IN INDIA 1, 12-33 (Anuradha Dingwaney Needham &
Rajeswari Sunder Rajan eds., 2007) (providing a brief overview of the field).
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recently as 2002, "[m]ore than 1,000 people, mostly Muslims[,]" died in
riots between religious groups in the state of Gujarat. 3 After state
officials and Hindu nationalists urged replacing a mosque with a Hindu
temple in Ayodhya in 1992,32 "more than a thousand people lost their
lives." 33 Balancing the demands of secularization and religion in such a
charged atmosphere puts Indian judges in the difficult position of
deciding what might push India across the line from being a republic
where people can practice religion freely to a republic that is no longer
secular.34
One might wonder how relevant India is to American courts. The
United States has its own share of violence linked to religion, 35 but the
riots following the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya have no
parallel in America's last two decades. Unlike the Constitution of India,
the Constitution of the United States does not require the country to be a
"secular democratic republic." 36 However, there are still lessons to be
had from India. Over time, Americans are participating in a wider range
of religious traditions. 3 Courts will struggle to decide whether new
31. Mark Dummett, India: Gujarat Policemen Charged with Misconduct, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 11, 2011, 7:16 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-
14491112; see also Christophe Jaffrelot, The 2002 Pogrom in Gujarat: The Post-
9/11 Face of Hindu Nationalist Anti-Muslim Violence, in RELIGION AND VIOLENCE
IN SOUTH ASIA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 173, 174-77 (John R. Hinnells & Richard
King eds., 2007) (describing the 2002 riots in Gujarat).
32. See WENDY DONIGER, THE HINDUS: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY 663-64
(2009); C.J. FULLER, THE CAMPHOR FLAME: POPULAR HINDUISM AND SOCIETY IN
INDIA 258-61 (rev. and expanded ed. 2004); HANSEN, supra note 27, at 172-84; VAN
DER VEER, supra note 27, at 2-7.
33. DONIGER, supra note 32, at 664.
34. See S.R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2019; Sen, supra note 30, at 5-7.
35. See Hate Crime Statistics: Incidents and Offenses 2009, FBI (Nov. 2010),
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2009/incidents.html (noting that "[f]aw enforcement
agencies reported 1,376 hate crimes motivated by religious bias" in 2009).
36. Compare INDIA CONST. pmbl., amended by The Constitution (Forty-second
Amendment) Act, 1976, with U.S. CONsT. amend I.
37. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 8-9.
38. See U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation: Diverse and
Dynamic, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, 5-6 (Feb. 2008),
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf. For a
survey of religious diversity in America, see generally DIANA L. ECK, A NEW
RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A "CHRISTIAN COUNTRY" HAS BECOME THE WORLD'S
MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION (2001).
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beliefs and practices are religious for purposes of the First Amendment. 39
Observing Indian courts' chosen definitions and perspectives can help
American judges see what has and has not allowed Indian citizens to
40participate in political society. Americans do mistreat each other on
account of religion, and courts have a role in blessing or condemning that
mistreatment. 4 1 If the Indian Supreme Court has promoted a peaceful
civil society through analysis of religion, the Court's rulings could be
instructive for American judges.42 Finally, although there is no
constitutional requirement that America be secular, some scholars argue
that the United States "should separate church and state" so "that our
government [can] be secular" as a constitutional norm.43 Indian judges'
analysis of being secular can clarify the meaning of being secular.44 India
and the United States might not be perfect parallels, but the United States
can still learn from India.45
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I surveys selected cases
applying the Establishment Clause to potentially religious displays. Part
II discusses an Indian Supreme Court decision addressing the meaning of
secularism. Part III applies the previous parts to explain how courts
should resolve a recent Establishment Clause challenge to a Ten
39. See Marshall, supra note 5, at 511.
40. See, e.g., S R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 1950-51;
JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 282.
41. See Church and State, supra note 5, at 2208; Vincent Blasi & Seana V.
Shiffi-in, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The
Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STORIES 409, 419-22 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) (describing violent attacks
on Jehovah's Witnesses after the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory flag salute
challenged by Witnesses, and noting that at least one vigilante thought that the
Supreme Court had called the Witnesses "traitors" and thus justified driving them
out of a town).
42. See, e.g., S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002-03 (analyzing
government action to determine if it would prevent "religious tolerance and equal
treatment of all religious groups and protection of their life and property");
JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 282.
43. See Church and State, supra note 5, at 2196.
44. See, e.g., S R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002 ("When the State allows
citizens to practise and profess their religions, it does not either explicitly or
implicitly allow them to introduce religion into non-religious and secular activities
of the State.").
45. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 8-9.
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Commandments display in a public high school. Part IV draws lessons
from both the United States and India to suggest a better application of
the Lemon v. Kurtzman test.46 Courts should reaffirm the endorsement
version of the Lemon test4 7 and presume that there are real but
impermissibly religious motives behind ostensibly secular displays of the
48Ten Commandments in public schools.
PART I: THE LEMONTREE AND ITS FRUIT: ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The Establishment Clause's larger history is beyond the scope of
this Note, but several milestones deserve attention. The story begins with
the Court using the Lemon test49 to keep the Ten Commandments out of a
school because of their religious import.50 Later, the Court changed
directions: instead of finding a partially religious meaning to be a
dispositive strike against an object, the Court allowed a nativity scene
and, in a plurality opinion, a Ten Commandments display. 52 Has the
Lemon test become a disfavored, incoherent doctrine with unpredictable
results, or an analytical tool that, with some refinement, can prevent
46. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (analyzing the constitutionality of programs
benefitting religious schools based on the programs' "legislative purpose[,]"
"effect[,]" and, citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, "government entanglement with
religion" (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))).
47. See infra Part I.
48. Cf Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 769 (arguing that "courts' analysis
should rely on a rebuttable presumption that a facially religious phrase or practice
has continuing religious meaning"); Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra
note 4, at 544-45 (arguing that "a presumption against the display of religious
symbols on public property .. . might lend a degree of predictability and minimize
the majoritarian bias inherent in the interpretation of religious symbols"); Marshall,
supra note 5, at 544 (arguing that "[a]ny governmental action benefitting religion in
the public schools, then, should be upheld only under extraordinarily narrow
circumstances").
49. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
50. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (per curiam).
51. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
52. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (plurality opinion).
53. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing "the strange Establishment Clause
[Vol. 10566
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religion from being used to make some citizens feel like less than full
participants in their community? 54 In short, has the Lemon test rotted or
ripened?
A. Bringing Lemon to the School
An early Establishment Clause challenge to a public display of
the Ten Commandments provides a useful starting point to modern
55 56jurisprudence. In Stone v. Graham, the Court invalidated "[a]
Kentucky statute requir[ing] the posting of a copy of the Ten
Commandments ... on the wall of each public classroom in the State.", 7
The Court relied on Lemon v. Kurtzman's standard for whether state
statutes comply with the Establishment Clause.58 "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.", 5 9 Rejecting Kentucky's argument that there was "a secular
legislative purpose" of highlighting the Commandments' historical
importance, 60 the Court held that the statute "has no secular legislative
purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional."
geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes" and citing opinions in which "five
of the [then] sitting Justices have" rejected the Lemon three-part test).
54. See supra Church and State, note 5, at 2206 (presenting Justice
O'Connor's Lynch concurrence, which referenced Lemon, as a model for how
Establishment Clause jurisprudence should prevent political alienation); Marshall,
supra note 5, at 538-49 (explaining how precedent, including cases relying on
Lemon, can be used to deduce more consistent rules for Establishment Clause cases,
especially in the public school setting).
55. The Establishment Clause has proved to be a conceptual tangle for
decades, even before the cases discussed supra. In Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing,
330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court noted that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions," but upheld "spending
tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils." Id. at 16, 17.
56. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 39.
58. Id. at 40 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
59. Id. (alteration in original).
60. Id. at 41.
61. Id.
567
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The majority in Stone incorporated a religious-secular divide into
its reasoning and required the government to place objects in a secular
curricular context to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.62 The
majority categorized the Ten Commandments as "undeniably a sacred
text" that "do[es] not confine [itself] to arguably secular matters"63 such
as "history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like."
"[A]rguably secular matters" deal with behaviors toward other human
beings as well as intellectual disciplines; "religious duties" involve
beliefs and actions regarding God. 65 The Stone Court defined religion in
terms of belief in a god who wants loyalty and provides followers with a
sacred text; the secular is what is outside of that religious realm.66
Although there are permissible uses for the Ten Commandments in the
public classroom,67 under the majority's decision the burden is on the
state to contain the Commandments' religiosity and place them in an
acceptably secular context that shows the state's neutrality toward any
. . 68
religious meaning.
62. See id. at 41-42.
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id. at 42.
65. Id. at 41-42.
66. Id. In other cases, the Supreme Court has taken conflicting positions on
whether a deity must be involved for an activity or belief to be religious. Compare,
e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965) (holding that, for purposes of
interpreting the relevant statute, "a given belief that is sincere and meaningful" can
qualify someone for a draft exemption if the belief "occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God"), and Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("Neither [states nor the federal government] can
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." (footnotes omitted)),
with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1962) ("Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the
demands of the Religion Clauses.").
67. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 (per curiam).
68. Id at 41-42. The Court's decision focused on the purpose prong of the
Lemon test. However, the Court clearly indicated that Kentucky was impermissibly
endorsing the Ten Commandments as an object of religious devotion. Id. "If the
posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to
induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey the
Commandments. . . . [This] is not a permissible state objective under the
Establishment Clause." Id. at 42.
568 [Vol. 10
2012] COOKING UP A NEW LEMON TEST
On the other hand, according to Justice William Rehnquist's
dissent in Stone, the First Amendment accommodates objects with some
69
religious meaning in government-owned spaces. Justice Rehnquist was
more willing than the majority to believe Kentucky's claim of a secular
goal and to accept for constitutional purposes a secular goal
"overlap[ping] with what some may see as a religious objective., 70 In his
view, "the public sector [does not have to] be insulated from all things
which may have a religious significance or origin."7 In other words,
Justice Rehnquist believed that some objects have religious and secular
meaning, and that having religious meaning in addition to a secular
meaning should not exclude an object from government- owned
72property. Under Justice Rehnquist's argument, the government can
maintain that an object has been a part of public culture long enough that
displaying it is acknowledging the country's innate religiosity. 73 In that
case, the government could rely on contemporary uses of words and
symbols to imply that the words or objects have never had a divisively
religious meaning at all, contrary to common knowledge.74 Despite what
the First Amendment requires, courts crediting such disingenuous
arguments might allow displays that leave citizens feeling that religion is
"relevant ... to status in the political community.",7 5
69. Id. at 45-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 44.
71. Id. at 45-46.
72. Id. at 44-46.
73. Cf. id. at 46 ("This Court has recognized that 'religion has been closely
identified with our history and government,' and that '[t]he history of man is
inseparable from the history of religion[.]' Kentucky has decided to make students
aware of this fact by demonstrating the secular impact of the Ten Commandments."
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
212 (1963)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962)).
74. Cf Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 747-48 (explaining how "speech
acts often appear to deny or conceal their original context" despite the importance of
"[p]ast social context" for meaning).
75. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also Church and State, supra note 5, at 2206.
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B. 0 Come, All Ye Faithful Historians: A Court Holiday, Round One
Four years after Stone, in Lynch v. Donnelly,7 the Court asked
whether the government could display a nativity scene.77 A Rhode Island
town "erect[ed] a Christmas display as part of its observance of the
Christmas holiday season"; 78 part of the display was a "cr&che . . .
consist[ing] of the traditional figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary
and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals." 79 The display was on
privately-owned land.80 The Court considered whether the Establishment
Clause barred the display and held that it did not, based on the Lemon
test.8 '
To justify upholding the display, the Court explained how it is
secular.8 The city had the purpose of displaying Christmas's "historical
origins" rather than advocating Christianity's virtues, and that purpose
made the scene "secular" enough to survive the Establishment Clause
challenge. The Court's description of the creche in historical rather than
devotional terms reflected the Stone Court's implied definition of
76. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
77. Id. at 670-71.
78. Id. at 671.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 670, 685 ("We are satisfied that the city has a secular purpose for
including the creche, that the city has not impermissibly advanced religion, and that
including the cr6che does not create excessive entanglement between religion and
government."). The Court searched for "a secular purpose" for state action, not a
solely secular purpose. Id. at 681 n.6 (emphasis added). Additionally, unlike the
Court's typical "ardent separationist" approach to religion in public schools,
Marshall, supra note 5, at 541, Lynch disclaimed the need for "total separation"
between church and state, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672. If a religion is widely shared, it
may be laudable for the government to recognize it. See id at 677-78. Similar
arguments justified upholding legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 792 (1983). For further analysis of legislative prayer and other examples of
ceremonial deism, which is largely beyond the scope of this Note, see generally
Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5. Perhaps recognizing that the foregoing
propositions from Lynch taken as a whole give the First Amendment a koan-like
ambiguity, Chief Justice Burger noted that "the Court consistently has declined to
take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
82. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680-81.
83. Id. at 680.
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religion as dealing with a supreme god and its worship.84 After Lynch,
government can cabin an object's religiosity and supplant it with secular
meaning by presenting the object as part of history.
Lynch is also significant because of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's concurrence, where she gave her own interpretation of
Lemon.86 Focusing on Lemon's "purpose and effect prongs[j,]" Justice
O'Connor argued that they involved, respectively, whether "the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval
of religion" and whether "the practice . .. in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval." 89 Engaging in practices with religious
meaning is not necessarily forbidden so long as there is no desired or
actual endorsement. 0
Applying her version of Lemon, Justice O'Connor found that
"the overall holiday setting . . . negates any message of endorsement of
that [religious] content."91 By acknowledging the role of context in
viewers' interpretation of displays, 92 Justice O'Connor properly focused
on how individuals' perception of symbols affects their sense of
84. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (per curiam) ("The
Commandments do not confine themselves to arguably secular matters .... The first
part of the Commandments concerns the religious duties of believers: worshipping
the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord's name in vain, and
observing the Sabbath Day.").
85. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680; Marshall, supra note 5, at 515 ("Basically,
[Chief Justice] Burger argued that Christmas and nativity scenes had been
sufficiently 'secularized' by our history and culture so that they did not violate
Lemon 's strictures of purpose and effect.").
86. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Jesse H.
Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 505
(2002).
87. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 691.
89. Id. at 690.
90. See id. at 690-93.
91. Id. at 692. Justice O'Connor compared the creche to "a typical museum
setting" that allows paintings with religious themes to be displayed without
proselytization. Id. The setting made the cr~che comparabale to legislative prayers
approved in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and other "government
acknowledgements of religion[,]" Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693, and distinguishable from
Ten Commandments that urge devotional practices upon viewers, Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam).
92. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
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belonging in the larger political community.93 What she did not explain
sufficiently in Lynch is whose perspective courts should consider. 9 4 The
malleability of the meaning of objects and words and the possibility for
disingenuous papering over of their history mean the selection of one
perspective as authoritative could endorse government acts that are
"offensive and alienating" 95 to many.96
C. 0 Christmas Tree ... What Are You? A Court Holiday, Round Two
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch resurfaced in County
ofAllegheny,97 where the Court considered whether the separate displays
of a creche and a menorah violated the Establishment Clause.98 The
creche display, owned by "a Roman Catholic group," was in the
Allegheny County Courthouse's Grand Staircase, the building's "'main,'
'most beautiful,' and 'most public' part[,]" and "include[d] figures of
the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm animals, shepherds, and wise men
. . . [as well as] an angel bearing a banner that proclaims 'Gloria in
Excelsis Deo!", A block away, at a public building owned by
Allegheny County and Pittsburgh and used for officials' offices, the City
displayed a "[forty-five]-foot Christmas tree" and "an [eighteen]-foot
93. See id. at 688; see also Marshall, supra note 5, at 515-16.
94. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690; Choper, supra note 86, at 510-11; Kristi L.
Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer's Eyes: The
Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 418, 446 (2006);
Marshall, supra note 5, at 533-35. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), Justice
O'Connor argued that "[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would
perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools." Wallace, 472 U.S. at
76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a history of how Justice O'Connor's "objective
observer" standard fared in subsequent cases, see Bowman, supra, at 447-61.
95. Marshall, supra note 5, at 535.
96. Cf Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 746-48 (explaining how the
government might use words without explicit reference to divisive historical
contexts but depend on those contexts to convey religious meaning).
97. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
98. See id. at 578.
99. Id. at 579 (plurality opinion) (quoting Appendix at 157-58, Cnty. of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)).
100. Id. at 580.
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Chanukah menorah."' 01 The City of Pittsburgh owned the Christmas tree,
and "a [private] Jewish group" owned the menorah.102 A divided Court
ruled that the creche was unconstitutional. 0 3 Justice Blackmun found
that the menorah is not an "endorsement of . .. [the] Jewish faith[]" but
that there might be constitutional concerns under "the 'purpose' or
'entanglement' prong of the Lemon analysis." The case was remanded
first to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 05 and then to the Western
District of Pennsylvania.106 The County did not display the Christmas
tree or the menorah at the courthouse following the Court's decision.'ov
The finding that a creche violated the Establishment Clause but a
menorah might not reflected the Court's division over how to analyze
Establishment Clause challenges.'os In Allegheny, Justice Blackmun used
the following test: "[T]he government's use of religious symbolism is
unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the
effect of the government's use of religious symbolism depends on its
context."' 09 Thus, Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test, presented in
Lynch as a "clarification" of the Lemon test, gained traction in a
plurality opinion that she joined only in part.111 Other opinions in
Allegheny indicated a variety of attitudes toward the Lemon test's utility
for Establishment Clause cases. 1 12 The range of opinions on the Court
101. Id. at 587.
102. Id. at 581, 587.
103. Id. at 602 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 620-21 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). Justice O'Connor agreed that the
menorah did not endorse Judaism, see id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment), and Justices Kennedy, White, and Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist thought that the menorah was "permissible," see id. at 655
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 621 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
106. ACLU v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 887 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1989).
107. See Editorial, Frosty, Save This Honorable Court, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22,
1989, at A6.
108. See Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 492.
109. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
110. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Il l. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573 (syllabus), 593 (portion of plurality
opinion joined by Justice O'Connor), 595 (portion of plurality opinion not joined by
Justice O'Connor); see Choper, supra note 86, at 505.
112. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 626, 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (evaluating objects based on whether they would
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foreshadowed the current possibility of it abandoning the Lemon test
entirely," 3 and suggested the need to incorporate Justice O'Connor's
insights in her Lynch concurrence into future decisions. 114
The majority of the Justices' analysis of the creche and menorah
depended, in part, on how they categorized the objects along the
religious-secular divide." 5 As in the earlier cases, one of the major
themes was that context affects whether objects send a sufficiently
secular message to pass Constitutional muster.11 6 Justice Blackmun
distinguished between Christmas's "cultural aspect" and its "theological
exclude observers from the "political community"); id. at 637 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 697, which approvingly referred to the Lemon three-
part test); id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring
to previous decisions, including Lemon, without deciding which one should be
controlling); id. at 655, 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("I am content for present purposes to remain within the Lemon
framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting that test as
our primary guide in this difficult area. . . . Our cases disclose two limiting
principles: government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous
indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' (quoting Lynch,
465 U.S. at 678)). For a summary of the Justices' votes in Cnty. of Allegheny, see
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1267 (4th
ed. 2011) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
113. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 1267-68 (describing "prospect
for a major change in the law in this area" after changes in the Court's composition);
Church and State, supra note 5, at 2204.
114. See Marshall, supra note 5, at 531-33.
115. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602 (majority opinion), 613-21
(Blackmun, J., opinion), 632-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment), 637-44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 652-
55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 665 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). But see id. at 666 ("[T]he
[Lynch] Court did not view the secular aspects of the display as somehow subduing
the religious message conveyed by the creche, for the majority expressly rejected the
dissenters' suggestion that it sought 'to explain away the clear religious import of the
cr~che' or had 'equated the creche with a Santa's house or reindeer."' (quoting
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685 n.12)).
116. See id. at 598-602 (majority opinion), 613-21 (Blackmun, J., opinion),
632-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 637-44
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 652-55 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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significance" in the United States," 7 and between Chanukah's "cultural
or secular dimension" compared to its "religious significance.". Justice
Blackmun's analysis of Chanukah gave examples of what is cultural
rather than religious.m As Justice Blackmun stated, "[ilndeed, the
Chanukah story always has had a political or national, as well as a
religious dimension: it tells of national heroism in addition to divine
intervention."l20 The "political and national" elements encompass
"national heroism"; "divine intervention" is in the "religious
dimension.""2 Although a majority of the Court did not join Justice
Blackmun's opinion in so far as it analyzed the menorah, other Justices
nonetheless followed Justice Blackmun in separating the "historical and
cultural" from the "religious."l22 In sum, the case suggested that the
secular is about an identifiable group's narrative of its past and thus
reinforced the Lynch majority's idea that a display can be secular if it
only acknowledges "a particular historic religious event."l23
In contrast to secular objects, religious objects are those that
make a statement about a god and people's relationship to it. 124 The
creche, for example, contained an angel proclaiming, "Glory to God in
the Highest!',125 The angel's words, and the creche, gave "praise to God
117. Id. at 579 n.3 (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 587.
119. Id. at 585-86.
120. Id. at 585.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("The opinion is correct to recognize that the religious holiday of
Chanukah has historical and cultural as well as religious dimensions, and that there
may be certain 'secular aspects' to the holiday."); id. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("It is no surprise and no anomaly that Chanukah has
historical and societal roots that range beyond the purely religious."); id. at 652-53
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (comparing artwork showing
Moses along with "Confucius and Mohammed" to artwork showing Moses along
with "secular figures such as Caesar August, William Blackstone, Napoleon
Bonaparte, and John Marshall alongside [Confucius and Muhammed]" to show that
the former image would be about religion, but the latter would be about "respect ...
for great lawgivers").
123. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
124. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598 (majority opinion), 634
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
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in Christian terms .. . just as .. . in a church service.',126 The display thus
had a "religious meaning" that the Court found "unmistakably clear." 27
The surrounding flowers and occasional carolers "[drew] one's attention
to the [cr6che's] message."1 2 8 Additionally, "[t]he fact that the creche
[bore] a sign disclosing its ownership by a Roman Catholic organization
. . . demonstrate[d] that the government [was] endorsing the religious
message of that organization."l29 The message was "that people [should]
praise God for the birth of Jesus."130 In sum, a message is religious
because it emphasizes a specific tradition's deity and how people ought
to think about and behave toward that deity.' 3 1
Courts attempting to analyze objects after Allegheny had to
consider whether to take the position of an observer who sees a display
as highlighting its theistic, evangelical qualities or an observer who sees
a display as highlighting its historical, documentary qualities.132
Choosing the latter perspective allows courts to ignore religious
divisiveness in symbolic objects or words. '33
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 599.
129. Id. at 600.
130. Id. at 601.
131. See id. at 611 ("Celebrating Christmas as a religious, as opposed to a
secular, holiday, necessarily entails professing, proclaiming, or believing that Jesus
of Nazareth, born in a manger in Bethlehem, is the Christ, the Messiah. If the
government celebrates Christmas as a religious holiday . . . it means that the
government really is declaring Jesus to be the Messiah, a specifically Christian
belief"). The Court's theistic conception of religion would be inadequate for a
religion that does not emphasize belief in deities, or an analogous belief structure, as
a path to salvation. See Peter Connolly, Introduction to APPROACHES TO THE STUDY
OF RELIGION, 1, 4-5 (1999) (noting that theistic definitions of religion exclude some
Buddhist traditions).
132. See Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 744-47; Marshall, supra note 5,
at 531-33.
133. Cf Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 744-48 (explaining how focusing
on words' occurrence in what are seen as non-religious contexts ignores the words'
commonly understood religious references).
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D. The Parting of the Justices: The Commandments Go to Court
The Court gave another pair of contradictory opinions in
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentuckyl34 and
Van Orden v. Perry,'35 which analyzed two displays of the Ten
Commandments under the Establishment Clause.' 36 Five Justices upheld
a preliminary injunction against the display in McCreary County because
there was "ample support for the District Court's finding of a
predominantly religious purpose behind the . . . display."l37 Yet five
other Justices voted to uphold the display in Van Orden.138 The
Commandments 39 in McCreary County were one of "nine framed
documents of equal size" hanging on a county courthouse wall.140
Writing for a majority in McCreary County, Justice David Souter
referred to Lemon's requirement of the government having "a secular
legislative purpose" as "a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element of
our cases."'41 Drawing attention to the fact that the county's attempt to
display the Ten Commandments in the courthouse followed two other,
similar efforts, one of which endorsed religion and "lack[ed] a secular
purpose[,]"l42 the majority upheld an injunction against the display
because it violated the secular purpose prong of Lemon.14 3
In contrast, the Commandments 4 at issue in Van Orden were
engraved on a stone "monolith . . . stand[ing] 6-feet high and 3-1/2 feet
wide."1 45 The monument was installed near the Texas Capitol and
134. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
135. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
136. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 850; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
137. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 881.
138. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692.
139. The County chose to display portions of Exodus 20:3-17 (King James).
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 855.
140. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 855.
141. Id. at 859.
142. ACLU of Ky. v. Pulaski Cnty., 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 699-700 (E.D. Ky.
2000).
143. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 851-56, 881.
144. The monument displayed portions of Exodus 20:3-17 (King James). See
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 707-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion).
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146Supreme Court in 1961. Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice
Rehnquist upheld the display based on "the nature of the monument and
. . . our Nation's history." 4 7 Contrary to Justice Souter's refusal to
"abandon Lemon's purpose test" in McCreary County,148 the plurality
thought that the Lemon test was "not useful in dealing with the sort of
passive monument that Texas . . . erected on its Capitol grounds." 49 In
McCreary County and Van Orden, respectively, neither Justice Souter
nor Justice Rehnquist explained why, faced with two reproductions of
the Ten Commandments during the same term, the Court could not at
least agree to apply the same analysis to both objects." 0
The decisive vote in the two cases was Justice Stephen Breyer,
who joined the majority in McCreary County'5' but concurred in the
judgment in Van Orden.15 2 His concurrence used the same notion of the
153
religious-secular dichotomy that other Justices used in the two cases,
146. Id. at 681-82.
147. Id.
148. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 861.
149. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686.
150. See id. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The inconsistency between the
decisions the Court reaches today in this case and in [McCreary County] only
compounds the confusion [over the Court's Establishment Clause precedent]."
(citation omitted)); Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 501-02
(describing different grounds for decisions); Laura S. Underkuffler, Through a Glass
Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 59, 62 (2006) (summarizing the
division on the Court between those who "insisted that the ideal of equal treatment
be retained" and those who "explicitly jettisoned the ideal of equal treatment by
government").
151. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 849.
152. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
153. See id. at 701-03; id. at 689-90 (plurality opinion) (noting that the
Commandments have an "undeniable historical meaning" in light of the frequent
depiction of Moses or two tablets in buildings in Washington, D.C., and references
to Moses in federal documents); id at 717, 717-18 nn.15-16 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Commandments send a religious message because they
are edicts from and about a deity, and that different versions of the Ten
Commandments reflect significant disagreements between religious traditions); id at
740 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that state informed people about obeying a
deity's commands, not "great lawgivers"). Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas's
concurrence in Van Orden avoided the religious-secular divide. See id at 692
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that "there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's
favoring religion generally); id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
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but with different results.154 In Justice Breyer's view, "the Court has
found no single mechanical formula [including the Lemon test] that can
accurately draw the constitutional line in every case . . . . [I]n such
[borderline] cases, [there is] no test-related substitute for the exercise of
legal judgment."15 5 Justice Breyer used the now familiar divide of the
religious being about a deity and the secular about culture and history, by
maintaining:
On the one hand, the Commandments' text
undeniably has a religious message, invoking,
indeed emphasizing the Deity . . . . In certain
contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten
Commandments can convey . . . a secular moral
message (about proper standards of social
conduct). And in certain contexts, a display of the
tablets can also convey a historical message (about
a historic relation between those standards and the
law) .... 6
The Texas display was such "that the State itself intended the
latter, nonreligious aspects" to control the display's meaning.' Justice
Breyer thought that the display's provenance in a private campaign "to
combat juvenile delinquency" indicated that Texas was more concerned
with proper behavior toward other people than with religion.
Additionally, the outdoor placement "does not readily lend itself to
Establishment Clause should prevent only "legal coercion" (quoting Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment)).
154. Compare Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701-03 (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment) ("The setting . .. (together with the display's inscription. about its origin)
communicates to visitors that the State sought to reflect moral principles, illustrating
a relation between ethics and law that the State's citizens, historically speaking, have
endorsed.... [T]hese factors provide a strong, but not conclusive indication that the
Commandments' text on this monument conveys a predominantly secular message
. . . ."), with id. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The reason this message stands
apart is that the Decalogue is a venerable religious text. . . . Attempts to secularize
what is unquestionably a sacred text defy credibility and disserve people of faith.").
155. Id. at 699-700 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
156. Id. at 700-01.
157. Id. at 701.
158. Id.
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meditation or any other religious activity. But it does provide a context
of history and moral ideals."' All of those factors, as well as the
decades in which no one argued about the display's religious nature,'60
meant that the display had a more secular than religious message. 161 For
Justice Breyer, a religious message would have meant mandating
behavior toward a deity or discouraging particular beliefs, but a secular
message would have focused-as he argued the Texas monument did-
on social norms and civic identity.162
Likewise, Justice Souter's majority opinion in McCreary County
concluded that the courthouse display impermissibly advanced a
"sectarian" goal by emphasizing scriptural references to a particular deity
and humans' relationship with the deity,163 rather than the permissible
purpose of "alluding to a general notion of law."' " Justice Souter made
his analytical approach even clearer when he distinguished McCreary
County from Allegheny: "Cr6ches . . . do not insistently call for religious
action . . . ; the history of posting the Commandments expressed a
purpose to urge citizens to act in prescribed ways as a personal response
to divine authority."' 65
Importantly, McCreary County expanded the role of an
"objective observer."1 6 6 The idea of an objective observer was introduced
implicitly in Lynch as part of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test but
only applied to Lemon's effect prong. 167 After McCreary County, courts
159. Id. at 702.
160. Id. at 701.
161. Id. at 702-03.
162. See id.; Church and State, supra note 5, at 2202; Douglas G. Smith, The
Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX.
REV. L & POL. 93, 99-100 (2007); Underkuffler, supra note 150, at 72-73
(summarizing Justice Breyer's argument that the Establishment Clause requires the
"government [to] remain neutral between religion and nonreligion, and between
religion and religion" but allows "historical practices and [government-sanctioned]
monuments clearly recognized by the reasonable observer as such").
163. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 871 (2005).
164. Id. at 868.
165. Id. at 877 n.24.
166. Id. at 862 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308
(2000)).
167. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Bowman, supra note 94, at 446 ("ln this formulation, a court would view the
purpose of the govemment as speaker from its own judicial perspective and shift its
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should analyze effects and purpose from an objective observer's
perspective. 6 8 The "'objective observer' . . . takes account of the
traditional external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute,' or comparable official act."169 In cases
where the challenged governmental action was preceded closely by
related acts, the objective observer should also take those acts into
account.170 Additionally, a reasonable observer seeing an "isolated
exhibition" of the Ten Commandments should presume that "the display
[is] . . . presumptively . . . meant to advance religion."17 However, the
objective observer cannot forget that "Stone did not purport to decide the
constitutionality of every possible way the Commandments might be set
out by the government, and under the Establishment Clause detail is
key."l 72 If the Commandments are placed in a different, more ostensibly
secular context, or the legislative history is different, than a reasonable
observer might still be unsure of whether the display is religious or
secular.173 Another question that was not at issue in McCreary County,
but would be in cases involving schools, is whether the objective
observer is an adult or a student.174 Courts relying on McCreary County
focus to the perspective of the reasonable observer when evaluating the perceived
effect.").
168. See Bowman, supra note 94, at 461.
169. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 862 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530
U.S. at 308).
170. See id. at 866 ("The Counties' position just bucks common sense:
reasonable observers have reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid
an observer 'to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 315)).
171. Id. at 867.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 874 ("Nor do we have occasion here to hold that a sacred text
can never be integrated constitutionally into a governmental display on the subject of
law, or American history."); Choper, supra note 86, at 510-13 (explaining
difficulties in defining the reasonable observer, including questions of the reasonable
observer's own knowledge and religious views).
174. Compare Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 ("Regardless of the
listener's support for, or objection to, the message, an objective Santa Fe High
School student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as
stamped with her school's seal of approval." (emphasis added)), with Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) ("Any objective observer familiar with
the full history and context of the Ohio program [providing vouchers for private
education, including parochial schools] would reasonably view it as one aspect of a
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cannot be sure if the relevant observer is a child or an adult, or how the
relevant observer's religious and political views compare to others'
views. "6
Despite the difficulty of identifying an objective, reasonable
observer, McCreary County's application of the Lemon test
presumptively governs Establishment Clause cases. 7 7  McCreary
County's summary of Lemon and its progenyl78 taught that "the
government cannot place religious symbols on government property in a
broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed schools, not as an endorsement
of religious schooling in general."). See also Bowman, supra note 94, at 461 (noting
differences in independent observer's characteristics across cases). The two seminal
twentieth-century cases dealing with minorities in public schools both suggest that
the perspective of a student who is a member of a minority group ought to receive
special solicitude in courts. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)
("To separate [African-American students] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone."); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1943)
("The State asserts power to condition access to public education on making a
prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by
punishing both parent and child. The latter stand on a right of self-determination in
matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude."); Marshall, supra note
5, at 531 n.214 (speculating "that the true spiritual guide of the school prayer
decisions was not the first amendment but rather [Brown]").
175. See Bowman, supra note 94, at 461.
176. See Choper, supra note 86, at 511.
177. See, e.g., ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837, 844 (6th Cir.
2010) ("The long-standing (but not always applied) test for determining whether
government action violates the Establishment Clause was first articulated in Lemon
v. Kurtzman." (citation omitted)); Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir.
2003) ("During the past decade, we have emphasized that the Lemon test guides our
analysis of Establishment Clause challenges."); ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Dixie Cnty.,
2011 WL 2784238, at *6 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2011) ("Both the Supreme Court and
the Eleventh Circuit continue to use the Lemon analysis, despite the fact that several
Justices and commentators have strongly criticized it."); Edith Brown Clement,
Public Displays of Affection . .. for God after McCreary and Van Orden, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 246-47 (2009); Underkuffler, supra note 150, at 67-68
(noting that the majority in McCreary required the government to maintain
"'neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion'
and avoid excluding individuals from the political community because of religion
(quoting McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860)).
178. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 859-61.
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manner that symbolically endorses religion." 79 To know if there is an
endorsement, courts must ask if an objective, "reasonable observer"
would think that the government action "has the effect of creating an
apparent endorsement of religion."'8so The perspective of a "reasonable
observer" will also govern whether the government "was motivated by
an impermissible . . . purpose." '8  However, Van Orden'82 was a
183
reminder that neutrality is not always required of the government. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, interpreted Van Orden to mean that there is a
special Establishment Clause exemption for Ten Commandments
displays that have been in place for decades.'18 The difficulty that civil
liberties groups have had in challenging displays of the Ten
Commandments following McCreary County and Van Orden reflects
Van Orden's accommodating spirit.'ss In fact, the current Roberts Court,
which includes Justices Samuel Alito, Elena Kagan, and Sonia
Sotomayor, and no longer includes Justice O'Connor, might entirely
179. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note I12, at 1269.
180. Bowman, supra note 94, at 461.
181. Id.
182. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
183. See Underkiuffler, supra note 150, at 73-74.
184. See Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008)
("Reading Van Orden and McCreary together, we conclude a limited exception to
the Lemon test exists in contexts closely analogous to that found in Van Orden. This
case presents such a closely analogous context. Therefore, it is clear that Van Orden
controls our decision.").
185. See ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837, 840-41 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding that display of Ten Commandments and other historical documents
in county courthouse does not have "impermissible purpose or . . . endorse[]
religion"); Card, 520 F.3d at 1021 (holding that Ten Commandments monument
near city-owned building and on public land does not violate Establishment Clause);
ACLU v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that display of
Ten Commandments and other historical documents in county courthouse does not
have impermissible "religious purpose" or "the effect of endorsing religion"); ACLU
Neb. Found. v. City of Pattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
granite monument displaying the Ten Commandments in city park does not violate
Establishment Clause). But see ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty., 607 F.3d 439, 449
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that displays of Ten Commandments in county courthouses
violated the Establishment Clause); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 568
F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that display of Ten Commandments at county-
owned historical society violates the Establishment Clause).
583
584 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
abandon the Lemon test.186 The divided final appellate ruling on
McCreary County,1 87 in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ruled the display impermissible, suggests that appellate judges are very
much aware of the Court's fractured view of the Establishment Clause
and the possibility for change in the law.189 If Lemon and its progeny are
to remain checks against government action endorsing a religion and
alienating citizens,'90 then Establishment Clause doctrine must be
clarified.' 9' Focusing on how allegedly religious symbols are perceived is
an important part of courts' inquiry, but the inquiry cannot remain
unclear about whose perspective governs.192
186. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 1250, 1269 ("If Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agree with [Justices] Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
[that the Court should give up the Lemon test], . . . the entire Lemon test will be
overruled. Moreover, as of this writing, it is unknown how the two newest Justices,
Sotomayor and Kagan, will deal with this issue.").
187. McCreary Cnty., 607 F.3d at 439.
188. Id. at 441.
189. See id at 452 (Ryan, J., dissenting) ("I cannot be too critical of my panel
colleagues who feel stare decisis bound by the Supreme Court majority's persistent
hostility to religion . . .. The result, I fear, is that federal courts will continue to close
the Public Square to the display of religious symbols as fundamental as the Ten
Commandments, at least until the Supreme Court rediscovers the history and
meaning of the words of the religion clauses of the First Amendment and jettisons
the flawed reasoning of Lemon v. Kurtzman."); Linda Greenhouse, Nine Justices and
Ten Commandments, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010, 9:07 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/nine-justices-and-ten-
commandments/.
190. See Church and State, supra note 5, at 2207.
191. See Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 493 (noting
"a widely recognized inconsistency, confusion, and apparent subjectivity in the
Supreme Court and lower court cases dealing with public displays of religious
symbolism").
192. See Choper, supra note 86, at 510-11; Putting Religious Symbolism in
Context, supra note 4, at 506-07; Marshall, supra note 5, at 531-33.
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PART II: THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AVOIDS THE TEMPLE OF DOOM:
THE BOMMAI CASE
Just as in the United States, the Supreme Court of India has had
to interpret constitutional provisions regarding religion.' 93 In 1994, for
instance, the Supreme Court of India decided a case, S.R. Bommai v.
Union oflndia,194 dealing with one of the most politically charged topics
in contemporary India: the destruction of a mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu
extremists.195
The mosque at Ayodhya dated to 1528 CE, when the Moghul
emperor Barbar's general built it.196 Per some local traditions, "the
mosque was built to replace an even more ancient Hindu temple to the
god Rama, which had occupied the spot from the eleventh century
[CE]."'97 Politicians appealing to a sense of national Hindu identity
198 199
sometimes use the image of Rama, a Hindu god, to gain support.
Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, and until the partition of India
and Pakistan in 1947, Hindus and Muslims have both worshipped at the
site.200 In 1947, after Hindus put "an image of [the god] Rama ... in the
193. See Sen, supra note 30, at 6-7. For reviews of the Indian Supreme
Court's engagement with constitutional provisions on religion and secularism, see
generally Sanghamitra Padhy, Secularism and Justice: A Review of Indian Supreme
Court Judgments, 39 ECON. & POL.WKLY. 5027, 5029 (2004); Seval Yildirim,
Expanding Secularism's Scope: An Indian Case Study, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 901, 907-
18 (2004). The Indian Supreme Court's treatment of religion in the principal case
discussed here is at odds with other cases. See Brenda Crossman & Ratna Kapur,
Secularism's Last Sigh?: The Hindu Right, the Courts, and India's Struggle for
Democracy, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 113, 113-14 (1997); Padhy, supra, at 5028; Sen,
supra note 30, at 37. A broader survey of those cases is beyond the scope of this
Note.
194. A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918.
195. For an introduction to the political and religious history of the mosque,
see supra note 32.
196. VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 2.
197. Id.
198. See GAVIN FLOOD, AN INTRODUCTION TO HINDUISM 108-09 (1996).
199. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 1-2 (noting that one Indian
politician's photograph on the cover of a national magazine "imitate[d the posture]
of... the god Rama with bow and arrows"); FULLER, supra note 32, 268-74 (noting
one Hindu nationalist group's role in "the mass production and distribution of small
stickers and badges depicting Rama and his future temple [at Ayodhya]").
200. VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 2.
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mosque" and violence followed, the Indian government prevented any
201further worship at the mosque and adjacent land.
202In the 1980s, Hindu nationalists, including members of
political parties as well as activist groups not formally part of political
203
parties, made access to the site for worship a national political issue.
Partially because of this political agitation, the Hindu nationalist
Bharatiya Janta party ("BJP")20 did well in the 1991 state elections in
Uttar Pradesh ("UP"), where Ayodhya is located, and gained control of
the UP government.205 The BJP and associated Hindu nationalist groups
"incit[ed] and exhort[ed] their followers to demolish the [mosque] and to
build a temple there. The [BJP-affiliated m]inisters . . . [took an] active
part in organising [sic] and sending [large groups] to Ayodhya.,,0 "[O]n
6 December 1992, a rally in Ayodhya [organized by the BJP and other
Hindu nationalists] . . . resulted in an attack on the mosque and its
subsequent demolition."2 07 The national government, controlled by a
rival party to the BJP, took over control of UP and dismissed BJP-
controlled governments in other states where governments allegedly
201. Id. at 2-3.
202. Hindu nationalism is movement based on the belief that "India was
always and will remain fundamentally Hindu in a civilizational sense, just as (it
[Hindu nationalism] implies) Muslims and other non-Hindus always were alien to
India and will remain so forever." HANSEN, supra note 27, at 11. For book-length
discussions of religious nationalism in India, see generally id.; VAN DER VEER, supra
note 27.
203. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 3-4.
204. "The BJP is a Hindu nationalist party which wishes to uphold the rights
of Hindus and establish in India a Hindu value system . .. ." FLOOD, supra note 198,
at 264.
[A]t the heart of the .. . founding party of the RSS-VHP-BJP
combine [of Hindu nationalist organizations], is the belief in a
homogeneous Hindu identity and culture as coterminous with
the nation, India, in which Muslims and Christians remain
foreigners and outsiders until such time as they give up their
religious difference.
Needham & Rajan, supra note 30, at 16.
205. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 5-6.
206. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 1995.
207. VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 6; see also DONIGER, supra note 32, at
664 (noting that "leaders of the BJP whipped a crowd of two hundred thousand into
a frenzy" before the crowd "attacked [the mosque] with sledgehammers").
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supported destroying the mosque at Ayodhya.208 Horrific violence
between Hindus and Muslims elsewhere in India followed. 20 9 "[T]he
destruction of the mosque provoked immense communal violence ....
More than a thousand people-most of them Muslims-were killed in
Bombay alone."210 Accordingly, what happened at Ayodhya and how the
211
site will be used by religious groups remains controversial.
The Supreme Court of India was confronted with the aftermath
of Ayodhya when members of the ministerial councils, dismissed by
Presidential proclamation, sued the national government to challenge the
proclamation's validity.212 The opinion involved multiple issues that are
213
beyond the scope of this Note, but the relevant portions focused on the
question of whether state officers' support for building a temple to Rama
at the site of the Ayodhya mosque "follow[ed] the objectives of
secularism which was part of the basic structure of the Constitution and
also the soul of the Constitution."2 14 If not, then the President of India
had a valid constitutional reason to take control of state governments; if
the state officials stayed true to India's secular character, then the
President would have needed alternative grounds to dissolve the state
governments.2 15
The Indian Supreme Court held that the President had a valid
constitutional reason to dissolve state governments because the state
216
officials violated the Constitution's requirement of secularism. The
Court reached this conclusion in light of three crucial points: the
217definitions of the religious and the secular, the importance of
208. VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 6. The President has constitutional
authority in India to take over state governments. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994
S.C. at 1959-60.
209. VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 7; DONIGER, supra note 32, at 664.
210. VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 7.
211. See India's Supreme Court Court Suspends Ayodhya Ruling, BBC NEWS
(May 9, 2011 4:16 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13330492 (describing
reaction to ruling on future use of mosque site at Ayodhya and continued interest in
matter).
212. S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2095-96.
213. See id. at 1950-52, 2000-03, 2013-23, 2064-69, 2107-11, 2113.
214. Id. at 2000.
215. See id. at 2111.
216. See id. at 2004, 2111.
217. See id. at 1951, 2000, 2002, 2017-19.
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government neutrality,218 and the legality of the central government
intervening to stop states from acting religiously.219
The Court's first task was to define the religious and the
secular.220 "Religion and secularism operate at different planes. Religion
is a matter of personal belief and mode of worship and prayer, personal
to the individual while secularism operates, as stated earlier, on the
temporal aspect of the State activity in dealing with the people professing
different religious faiths." 2 2 1 These definitions recall the ways in which
the United States Supreme Court distinguished between the religious and
222the secular. For both the Indian Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court, religion is about people's belief in and actions with
respect to deities, or analogous figures, and the secular is about how
223people treat other human beings.
Having defined the religious and the secular, the Court held that
the government, as a secular one, must remain neutral in its treatment of
224
religions. As the Court said,
218. See id. at 1952, 2000, 2014, 2113.
219. See id. at 2045-46.
220. See id. at 1951, 2000, 2002, 2017-19.
221. Id. at 2017; see also id. at 2000 ("Article 25 of the Constitution
guarantees to all persons equally the freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess, practise [sic] and propagate religion subject to public order, morality and
health and subject to the other Fundamental Rights and the State's power to make
any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity which may be associated with religious practices."); id at 2002 ("The
freedom and tolerance of religion is only to the extent of permitting pursuit of
spiritual life which is different from the secular life.").
222. See supra Part I.
223. For citations for the United States Supreme Court, see supra Part I. For
the Indian Supreme Court's definition, see S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 1951,
2000,2002, 2017-19.
224. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 1952 ("[The Chairman of the
Drafting Committee for the Constitution of India] was . . . careful while drafting the
Constitution to ensure that adequate safeguards were provided in the Constitution to
protect the secular character of the country and to keep divisive forces in check so
that the interests of religious, linguistic, and ethnic groups were not prejudiced."); id.
at 2000 ("These provisions by implication prohibit the establishment of a theocratic
State and prevent the State either identifying itself with or favouring [sic] any
particular religion or religious sect or denomination. The State is enjoined to accord
equal treatment to all religions and religious sects and denominations."); id. at 2014
("The State guarantee[s] individual and corporate religious freedom and dealt with
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[w]hile the citizens of this country are free to
profess, practice and propagate such religion, faith
or belief as they choose, so far as the State is
concerned, i.e., from the point of view of the State,
the religion, faith or belief of a person is
immaterial. To it, all are equal and all are entitled
to be treated equally. How is this equal treatment
possible, if the State were to prefer or promote a
particular religion, race or caste, which necessarily
means a less favourable [sic] treatment of all other
religions, races and castes. How are the
Constitutional promises of social justice, liberty of
belief, faith or worship and equality of status and of
opportunity to be attained unless the State eschews
the religion, faith or belief of a person from its
consideration altogether while dealing with him,
his rights, his duties and his entitlements. 225
Much like some interpretations of the Establishment Clause in the
226American Constitution, the Court's interpretation of secularism meant
that the government could not indicate a preference for any one religion
227
over others. The Supreme Court noted that "the religion, faith or belief
of a person is immaterial" to government policy in so far as
228governmental policy might negatively discriminate based on religion.
an individual as citizen irrespective of his faith and religious belief and does not
promote any particular religion nor prefers one against another."); id. at 2113
("[F]rom the point of view of the State, the religion, faith or belief of a person is
immaterial. To the state, all are equal and entitled to be treated equally.");
JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 146-47 (noting that "[t]he dominant [argument] is
equal treatment of religions").
225. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C., at 2065-66.
226. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
("Neither [a state nor the federal government] can pass laws which ... prefer one
religion over another."); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)
("When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of
advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official
religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible
object is to take sides.").
227. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2065-66.
228. Id. at 2065.
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If the state were to classify citizens to their detriment based on religion,
then the state would renege on its constitutional duty to "eschew[] the
religion ... of a person from its consideration altogether[.]" 22 9 Any state
distinctions that prefer some citizens over others based on religion are a
forbidden act of "prefer[ing] or promot[ing] a particular religion."
2 30
According to the Court, secularism means-in part-a religiously neutral
government that does not discriminate against citizens based on
231
religion. The neutrality requirement, along with the government's
232
obligation to reform social practices connected to religion, means that
all religions should be equal in the government's eyes, and all Indians
ought to be equal members of the polity.233
Having defined religion and articulated the government's
relationship to it,234 the Court held that the federal government could
properly prevent religious divisiveness by intervening in the face of
clearly sectarian actions. 23 5
229. Id. at 2066.
230. Id. at 2065-66.
231. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 146-47; Padhy, supra note 193, at
5028 (noting that "the [C]ourt strongly held the opinion that secularism undeniably
sought to separate the religious from the political"); Sen, supra note 30, at 8 (noting
the Court's emphasis on "secularism as an essential component of democracy as well
as of national unity and integration"). While maintaining that the government must
avoid invidious religious discrimination, the Court recognized the government's
ability and obligation to intervene in matters connected to religion for the sake of
correcting social inequalities. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2018-19;
JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 151. In so far as the Indian Supreme Court recognized
the government's "missionary role to reform the Hindu society [and] Hindu social
order[,]" S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2019, the Indian Supreme Court differed
from the Supreme Court of the United States. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, _ U.S. _, , 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)
(concluding that "[t]he interest of society in the enforcement of employment
discrimination statutes" is outweighed by "the interest of religious groups in
choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their
mission").
232. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2018-19.
233. See id. at 2066. For further explanation of this Indian version of
secularism, or "ameliorative secularism," see JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 94.
234. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2000, 2002, 2017-20.
235. See id. at 2045-46. For a description of the relevant constitutional
mechanism, which is beyond the scope of this Note, see id.
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In trying to decide how the events at Ayodhya and the state
governments' role in them fit into the religious-secular divide, the Indian
Supreme Court had to respond to the BJP's claims that it was promoting
a national rather than religious identity.236 In public statements prior to
the mosque's destruction, the BJP presented its goal of building a temple
to Rama as "a symbol of . . . our cultural heritage and national self-
respect. For [the] BJP it is purely a national issue and [no] vested interest
[should] give it a sectarian and communal colour." 2 37 The BJP's claim
that it was really engaged in the creation of a civic identity rung hollow
to the Supreme Court because the BJP failed to show "religious tolerance
and [provide] equal treatment of all religious groups."238 Because
secularism requires equal treatment of religious communities, the Court
found that the BJP violated the "secularism enshrined in our
Constitution."239 Since secularism is a constitutional requirement, the
federal government had authority to take over BJP-run state governments
that violated secularism.240
The Court's reasoning is compelling. The BJP's public
comments and actions were an "an appeal to religion" because they
targeted a discrete community that the Court saw as religious.241 A
religious community is one distinguished by distinct "belief~s] and
mode[s] of worship and prayer."242 Because the BJP appealed to and
encouraged the belief that the proper worship of the deity Rama includes
the rebuilding of a temple to him at Ayodhya,243 the BJP involved itself
in people's "belieffs] and mode[s] of worship and prayer."244 When state
governments appealed to belief at the expense of Muslims, who were
harmed in the aftermath of the mosque demolition, the states acted
religiously, not secularly.245
236. Id. at 2002.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2003.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 2045-46.
241. See id. at 2002.
242. Id. at 2017.
243. See FULLER, supra note 32, at 271; VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 4-6.
244. S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2017.
245. See id. at 2002-03; JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 147, 153-54.
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The Indian Supreme Court's ruling and its context is instructive
for American courts because it shows why actions or objects that most
people would see as religious should not be treated as secular simply
because of an ostensibly secular rationale or context.246 If the Supreme
Court had accepted the BJP's argument that its support for building a
temple to Rama at Ayodhya was about a secular national identity rather
than religion,247 the Court would have excluded non-Hindus; some
Hindus who do not want to be involved in acts that could be conflated
with the worship of Rama; and devotees of Rama who do not want their
worship to be subsumed into a national political project.248 Many Indians
who do not identify as Hindus, especially Muslims, do not want a
national identity symbolized by a temple to Rama at Ayodhya.249 The
notion that being a true Indian requires supreme loyalty to a temple to
Rama at Ayodhya250 is false to many Indians, who want to be part of
246. Cf Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 747-48 (explaining how speech
attempting to remove religious symbols from a divisive religious context is hard
pressed to entirely hide the earlier, divisive context).
247. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002; HANSEN, supra note 27, at
174.
248. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 32, at 271 (describing one socially
ostracized villager who cannot participate in his own village's worship rituals and
therefore finds the more remote temple at Ayodhya meaningless, and also describing
a Hindu devotee of Rama who objected to the politicization of the deity and did not
support Hindu nationalists' Rama-based campaign); HANSEN, supra note 27, at 177
(describing how another Hindu nationalist organization's rhetoric "sought to
transform the worship of Ram[a] from a localized and heterogeneous set of religious
practices to be a symbolic expression of a supposed syncretic and inherent 'unity in
heterogenity' of Hindu culture"); VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 9-10 (describing
some Indian Muslims' desire to participate in a secular Indian state that protects
them through, in part, symbolic actions such as safeguarding historical Islamic
buildings). The Indian Supreme Court's acknowledgement of religious conflict, see
S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002, is a stark, welcome contrast to Justice
Scalia's disregard for the Ten Commandments' sectarian history. See McCreary
Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 909-10 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not widely known.").
249. See After Partition: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, BBC NEWS (AUG. 8,
2007, 3:39 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/indepth/629/629/6922293.stm (noting
that approximately thirteen percent of Indians are Muslim, two percent are
Christians, almost two percent are Sikhs, less than one percent are Buddhists, and
less than one percent are Jains); VAN DER VEER , supra note 27, at 9-10.
250. See G. Vazirani, Extract from an Interview of L.K. Advani, in HINDU
NATIONALISM: A READER 282, 287 (Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., 2007) ("[T]here is but
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India the political state but do not think of Ayodhya as special because of
its connection to Rama.25 Even those who worship Rama or attribute
religious significance to Ayodhya do not necessarily do so in the way
252that the BJP wanted. Indian religious practices include "deeply
embedded heterodox, syncretic and pluralist religious and philosophical
folk traditions" that overflow "the artificial boundaries of modern
political identities." 253 When Hindu nationalists did not acknowledge that
worshipping Rama at a temple in Ayodhya would involve more than
, 254
civic identity, they attempted to recreate the Indian state in a way that
did not tolerate diversity.255 By recognizing that the BJP's argument
marginalized many Indians based on their religion, the Indian Court
denied legitimacy to Hindu nationalist arguments that excluded millions
of people who are not Hindus or the right sort of Hindus from
membership in the Indian polity.m
one India, and ... this India, and its entire population, Hindu or Muslim, can identify
itself only with Rama and not with Babar [whose general supposedly built the
mosque at Ayodhya].").
251. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 9-10.
252. See FULLER, supra note 32, at 271; HANSEN, supra note 27, at 177.
253. WILLIAM DALRYMPLE, NINE LIVES: IN SEARCH OF THE SACRED IN
MODERN INDIA at xvi (2010).
254. See S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 2002.
255. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 154; VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at
10. For an example of Hindu nationalist rhetoric that claims non-Hindu Indians are
nonetheless fundamentally Hindu, and thus erases a difference that many Indians
take seriously, see Atal Behari Vajpayee, The Bane of Pseudo-Secularism, in HINDU
NATIONALISM: A READER 315, 316 (Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., 2007) ("The Muslims
and Christians for whom India is a home have not come from outside. Their
ancestors were Hindus and Hindu blood flows in their veins. A change in religion
does not mean a change in nationality or culture.").
256. See HANSEN, supra note 27, at 177 (describing how Hindu nationalist
discourse marginalizes local religious traditions that do not comport with
nationalists' political project); id. at 178-79 (describing how Hindu nationalist
discourse demonizes Muslims); JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 155 ("[P]olitical
outcomes depend on the achievement of a dominant position in the way in which
societal conflict gets to be defined. As in other places, playing the communal card in
India (as in the vindication of our cultural-that is, Hindu-heritage), can be a very
effective means of maintaining the status quo in social and economic privilege.");
Needham & Rajan, supra note 30, at 16 ("For at the heart of the ... founding party
of the RSS-VHP-BJP combine [of Hindu nationalist organizations], is the belief in a
homogeneous Hindu identity and culture as coterminous with the nation, India, in
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Had the Court accepted the BJP's arguments, the sincere
religious convictions of Rama's devotees who wanted to honor him at
Ayodhya would also have been marginalized or distorted.257 For some
258
people, Rama is the incarnation of the divine. A temple built for the
ostensibly secular reason that the BJP offered the Supreme Court of India
would send a contradictory or confused message.259 Assuming that the
BJP had not entirely lost sight of worshipping Rama at the desired
temple, then the temple would be a place for both worshipping Rama and
building a national identity.260 In that scenario, if the BJP was sincere in
wanting to include every Indian in its project, then the project would also
include the many Muslims, Christians, Jews, Jains, Sikhs, and Buddhists
261in India. In that case, the worship of Rama would be done by or
associated with people who do not accept the divinity of Rama, or at
least have strong loyalties to other deities or traditions in addition to
262Rama. In that case, the belief that Rama is the supreme deity, or the
deity most deserving of worship,263 seems significantly undermined by
the implied message that one could worship Rama at Ayodhya but
maintain equally significant religious loyalties to other objects of
264
worship. If the BJP intended the temple at Ayodhya to be entirely
which Muslims and Christians remain foreigners and outsiders until such time as
they give up their religious difference.").
257. See, e.g., FLOOD, supra note 198, at 145-46 (describing contemporary
cults devoted to Rama); FULLER, supra note 32, at 163-69 (describing one order of
Rama's devotees, many of whom live in Ayodhya); HANSEN, supra note 27, at 177
(describing how Hindu nationalist discourse marginalizes local religious traditions).
258. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 2; FLOOD, supra note 198, at 107-
09 (describing epics that narrate Rama's story), 145-46 (describing contemporary
cults devoted to Rama).
259. Cf Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 747-48 (explaining how speech
attempting to remove religious symbols from a divisive religious context does not
entirely hide the earlier conflict, leading to symbols with many meanings).
260. See S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 2002.
261. See After Partition: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, BBC NEWS (AUG. 8,
2007, 3:39 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in depth/629/629/6922293.stm.
262. See DALRYMPLE, supra note 253, at xvi; HANSEN, supra note 27, at 177.
263. For example of devotees who focus their worship on Rama, see FLOOD,
supra note 198, at 145-46; FULLER, supra note 32, at 163-69.
264. For many Hindus, devotion to multiple deities or different forms of the
same deity and participation in different religious communities is normal. See
FULLER, supra note 32, at 30. Hindu nationalists who advocated for building a
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focused on a sense of Indian national identity without reference to any
particular deity,265 then people's desire to commemorate Rama would be
266
thoroughly frustrated. Regardless of whether the temple was meant to
267be a mix of nation-building and devotion to Rama, or just civic
identity,268 the Indian government would have made the worship of
Rama at Ayodhya less centered on Rama than some of Rama's partisans
would want.
The story of Ayodhya contains important lessons for arguments
about American displays of religious objects. In Lynch269 and Van
Orden,270 the United States Supreme Court allowed government-
sanctioned displays of a creche and the Ten Commandments because
they ostensibly symbolized history and civic identity.271 For many
people, cr~ches and the Commandments have such a strong tie to religion
that seeing them as primarily symbolizing something else is absurd and
272
offensive. American courts err when they analyze symbols without
sufficiently considering whose perspective to assume.273 Had the Indian
274
Supreme Court been in the same interpretative muddle in Bommai, it
would have inquired into the meaning of a temple at Ayodhya without
knowing whether to think about the temple from the viewpoint of a
Hindu in favor of it or a Muslim opposed to it.275 Without further
guidance, the Court might have readily deferred to claims of nation-
temple to Rama at Ayodhya did not accept such flexibility. See HANSEN, supra note
27, at 177.
265. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002.
266. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 4 (describing how the BJP
encouraged the commemoration of Rama); FULLER, supra note 32, at 271 (stating
the same).
267. For examples of how the campaign to build a temple included devotion to
Rama as well as "political militancy," see HANSEN, supra note 27, at 164-65.
268. See S. R. Bommai, A.LR. 1994 S.C. at 2002.
269. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
270. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
271. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92.
272. See supra note 2.
273. See Choper, supra note 86, at 510-11; Putting Religious Symbolism in
Context, supra note 4, at 506-07; Marshall, supra note 5, at 538.
274. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918.
275. Cf. Choper, supra note 86, at 511 ("For example, is the reasonable
observer a member of one of the regnant faiths, a minority adherent, or an atheist?").
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building.276 Instead, the Court relied on a constitutional presumption
against state involvement in religion277 and implicitly took the
perspective of a member of the Muslim minority who would have seen
278
what happened at Ayodhya as an attack. That thumb on the scale was
279
enough to make the Court scrutinize the BJP's arguments carefully.
The lesson for American courts is that potentially religious symbols in
symbolically important settings deserve skepticism so that paeans to
280
civics and history cannot be used to whitewash division.
As the Indian Supreme Court recognized, the BJP and Hindu
nationalists intended to promote a form of Indian nationalism that "takes
one religion as the basis of national identity, thereby relegating adherents
of other religions to a secondary, inferior status."281 As the Supreme
Court of India rightly concluded, "The very manifestoes and [BJP-led
state governments'] programme [sic] of action were such as to hurt the
religious feelings of the Muslim community. The demolition of the
disputed structure was no ordinary event. The disputed structure had
become the focal point, and the bone of contention between two religious
communities."282 Removing a mosque used by Muslims for worship and
replacing it with a site to be used by Hindus sends an unavoidably
sectarian message to Muslims in India.28 3 "[A] mosque is sacred space. It
cannot simply be demolished or removed. The very idea that a mosque
should make room for a temple, in which images are worshiped, sounds
like an utter defeat of Islam and is therefore highly repugnant to
276. But see S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002-03.
277. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
278. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 9-10.
279. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002-03.
280. See Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 747-48, 755-56; cf Padhy, supra
note 193, at 5029 ("While the Bommai case strongly called for separating the two
spheres [of the religious and the secular], in [a subsequent case] the Supreme Court
has let manifest appeals to religion stand by, redefining those appeals as appeals to
culture or history, oblivious to the context that fosters those appeals. The court thus
seems to have appropriated the symbols of Hindu India as Indian culture and
history.").
281. VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 23; see also JACOBSOHN, supra note 25,
at 284.
282. S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 1998-99.
283. See VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 9.
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Muslims."284 If politicians advocate replacing a politically charged
mosque with a Hindu temple, they violate the Indian Supreme Court's
definition of secularism and the Indian Constitution's requirements of a
secular government.2 s More importantly for American courts trying to
make sense of symbols with religious meaning, Bommai's theory of what
it means to be secular can help promote a more inclusive "civic
community.'286 The key in Bommai was the initial presumption that
government acts suggesting religious exclusion are problematic and
require careful scrutiny.
PART III: BETWEEN STONE AND A HARD PLACE
Of course, seeing a dangerous conflation of government and
religion is much easier in a foreign country. Plaques on school walls
might seem more innocuous than demolished mosques, but endorsing
287
religion is just as inappropriate in the United States as it is in India.
Public schools' political and cultural significance mean that a
presumption against the government use of potentially religious symbols
288therein is especially important. A Ten Commandments case filed in
284. Id.
285. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 2002-03; JACOBSOHN, supra note
25, at 147.
286. JACOBSOHN, supra note 25, at 281-82.
287. See id.; Church and State, supra note 5, at 2206. One objection to the
comparison between the Bommai case and a public display of the Ten
Commandments is that the former involves government action while the latter only
involves government speech. However, even if one were to accept arguendo that the
display is only government speech, speech has the power "to do [something]"
beyond make descriptive statements. J.L. AusTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS
6 (J.O. Urmson ed., 1962). As Justice Alito observed, when the government speaks
by accepting or displaying monuments, the speaking is establishing the
government's views and thus has a normative influence over a polity's character. See
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) ("Government
decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what they view as appropriate for
the place in question, taking into account such content-based factors as esthetics,
history, and local culture. The monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to
convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus
constitute government speech.").
288. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) ("The Court has
been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in
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2011, Doe 1 v. School Board of Giles County,289 could allow courts to
rule against a divisive, religiously-motivated display, thus reinvigorating
the core teaching of Lemon and its progeny: the government may not
endorse a religion or religion generally.290
In Giles County, Virginia, a high school posted a copy of the Ten
Commandments in "a main hallway at the high school, near the trophy
case and on the way to the cafeteria, where it [could] be seen by students
every day."291 In addition to the Ten Commandments, there were
"historical documents relating to American history, such as the
Declaration of Independence, the Star-Spangled Banner, and the Virginia
Statute for Religious Freedom." 2 92 As of early April 2012, a student and
parent, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia
elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the
education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict
with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family."); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943) (noting that both the state and
religion use symbols to inculcate loyalty, and that rituals performed at school affect
students' loyalties); Marshall, supra note 5, at 541.
289. Doe I v. Sch. Bd. of Giles Cnty., No. 7:11-cv-00435-MFU (W.D. Va.
Sept. 13, 2011); Complaint, Doe 1, No. 7:11 -cv-00435-MFU (W.D. Va. Sept. 13,
2011), available at http://acluva.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/20110913
GilesColOCsDoecomplaint.pdf
290. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860, 878 (2005)
(noting the "central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality," and
finding that neutrality is violated when the government "take[s] sides" in religious
disputes and thus excludes individuals from membership in polity); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong
of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement
or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the
challenged practice invalid."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)
(setting out three part test for Establishment Clause challenges); Choper, supra note
86, at 499 (noting the Court's adoption of "the 'endorsement test"' that was
"championed by Justice O'Connor"). Even if Choper is correct that "[t]he Court
implicitly abandoned the Lemon test" in favor of the "'endorsement' test[,]" Choper,
supra note 86 at 499, Justice O'Connor "position[ed the endorsement test] as a re-
reading of the purpose and effect prongs of Lemon[,]" id. at 505.
291. ACLU OF VIRGINIA, supra note 1.
292. Id.
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(ACLU) and the Freedom from Religion Foundation, are challenging the
293
display on Establishment Clause grounds.
Before the challenged display was posted, every public school in
Giles County displayed a copy of "the Decalogue . . . in a single frame
along with a copy of the United States Constitution., 29 4 The simpler
displays were originally given to schools by private citizens after the
shootings at Columbine High School and were briefly taken down in late
2010 after the ACLU and the Freedom from Religion Foundation
complained to the school system.295 Community members objected
vigorously on religious grounds, and in January of 2011 the school board
voted to return the simpler displays of the Constitution and the
296Decalogue to the schools. As rumors of litigation spread in February of
2011, the school board again voted to take down the Ten
297Commandments. Citizens criticized the board for failing to honor
county residents' religious views. 2 98 "Many supporters made clear that
they viewed the Ten Commandments displays as expressing approval for
their religious beliefs and, therefore, did not want them removed from
the schools."2 99 In fact, "approximately 200 Giles High School students
walked out of class in support of community efforts to restore the
displays to the schools.', 3 00 In June of 2011, the school board approved
the challenged display of the Ten Commandments along with various
historical and political documents .30 1 The plaintiffs filed suit in the fall of
2011, shortly after school began.302
The text and context of the Giles County display is comparable
to the Ten Commandments monuments discussed above. Like Stone, 303
304 305McCreary County, and Van Orden, the case centers on the Ten
293. Id.
294. Complaint, supra note 289, at 2.
295. Id. at 3-4.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 4.
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 5.
301. Id. at 5-6.
302. ACLU OF VIRGINIA, supra note 1.
303. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
304. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
305. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
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Commandments. Unlike the display in Stone,306 but like the display in
McCreary County, there is an attempt to clothe Ten Commandments in
secular garb by surrounding them with political documents.30 s The visual
effect is analogous to Hindu nationalists' rhetorical placement of a
309
temple at Ayodhya in the context of Indian political unity. The
outcome of the case hinges on whether the plurality's opinion in Van
310Orden or the majority's opinion in McCreary County controls. Perhaps
when Justice O'Connor was still on the Court and observers were not so
concerned about the fate of the Lemon test, the plaintiffs might only
have had to cite Stone and McCreary County and highlight the factual
similarity of posting the Ten Commandments in a public, government-
312
owned building to win summary judgment and subsequent affirmation.
At present, however, the case is less certain.3 13
One way of resolving the case is to make Van Orden controlling
and uphold the display. 3 14 Like the display at issue Van Orden, the
"passive" 315 display in Giles County is about the "historical origins" of
31631American law and acknowledgement of America's religious past.317 If
courts follow Van Orden, then the display's nature makes the Lemon test
inapposite and requires a court to resolve the matter based on "the nature
of the monument and . . . our Nation's history."318 The political
documents around the Commandments put them clearly on the secular
side of the secular-religious line drawn in the Establishment Clause cases
306. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
307. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 856.
308. See Complaint, supra note 289, at 6.
309. See S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 2002.
310. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92; McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 881.
311. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 1250, 1269.
312. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 873; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-
43 (1980) (per curiam).
313. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 1250, 1269.
314. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92.
315. Id. at 686.
316. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
317. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686.
318. See id. ("Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort
of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our
analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation's history.").
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noted above.319 Although the display at issue in Giles County is several
decades more recent than the display in Van Orden,320 some posting of
the Ten Commandments has been on display at the school for more than
a decade and the only concerns noted in the complaint are those related
to the litigation. 32 1 There is thus little evidence that the display has been
inappropriately "divisive" prior to the present case.322 Also like the
323
display in Van Orden, the display in Giles County originated in an
attempt to improve students' behavior; its location in a busy, crowded
school building "does not readily lend itself to meditation or any other
religious activity." 32 4 Thus, by analogy to Van Orden, the display is not
325
unconstitutional.
Bommai is helpful to understanding why upholding the Giles
County display would ignore people's sincerely held religious beliefs.
Upholding the Giles County display would make one of several
possibilities constitutional when none of them should be. One possibility
is that courts would accept the claim that the display is about using legal
history to promote a civic identity.326 That claim is analogous to the
319. See, e.g., id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("In certain contexts, a display
of the tablets of the Ten Commandments can convey . . . a secular moral message
(about proper standards of social conduct). And in certain contexts, a display of the
tablets can also convey a historical message (about a historic relation between those
standards and the law) ....
320. See id.
321. Complaint, supra note 289, at 2-3.
322. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704.
323. Id. at 701.
324. Id. at 702.
325. See id. at 691-92 (plurality opinion).
326. As the defendants pointed out to the district court, the School Board
approved the following resolution to be posted as part of the challenged display:
A sense of historical context, civic duty and responsibility, and
a general appreciation and understanding of the law of this
land are all desirable components of the education of the youth
of the county. We believe these . . . documents positively
contribute to the educational foundations and moral character
of students in our schools.
Rebuttal Brief for Defendant in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 7, Doe 1 v. Sch.
Bd. of Giles Cnty., No. 7:11-cv--00435-MFU (W.D. Va. Nov. 8,2011).
The defendants relied on that resolution and the placement of the
Commandments along with other "historical documents" to argue that there was no
impermissibly religious purpose. See id. at 7; cf Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
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BJP's claim that building a temple at Ayodhya was about using a
potentially religious object to build a shared identity among Indians;
327promoting Rama was not the point. In reality, people urged the school
board to return the Ten Commandments to the wall precisely because of
their religious content,328 just as some people wanted to build a temple at
329Ayodhya because they wanted to promote the worship of Rama. Also,
the plaintiff is offended because of the display's religious content, just as
Muslims (among others) were hurt because the BJP wanted to build a
temple to replace a mosque.33 Thus, upholding the display in Giles
County because it is secular suffers from the same defect as concluding
that the BJP's goal in Ayodhya is secular: discounting sincerely held
religious beliefs and alienating those who do not hold them.331
Another possibility is that courts could uphold the display
despite recognizing that there is the clear appearance of a religious
332purpose. This ruling would have the advantage of recognizing the
expressed motivations of supporters of the display, but it would have the
far more significant disadvantage of leaving the student-plaintiff feeling
like "an outsider and not a fill participant in the school community." 3 3
792 (1983) ("To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the
laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'establishment' of religion or a step toward
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among
the people of this country."); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92 ("Texas has treated its
Capitol grounds monuments as representing the several strands in the State's
political and legal history. The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument.in
this group has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and government.").
327. See S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 2002.
328. Complaint, supra note 289, at 3-5.
329. See HANSEN, supra note 27, at 176-77.
330. See Complaint, supra note 289, at 6; VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 9.
331. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 717 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Attempts
to secularize what is unquestionably a sacred text defy credibility and disserve
people of faith."); Rebuttal Brief for Defendants, supra note 326, at 8 ("The Board
merely included one religious document in a display containing numerous historical
documents that influenced the development of the laws in this nation and in
Virginia."); Church and State, supra note 5, at 2193-94 (noting that people have
religious motivations for displaying the Ten Commandments on government
grounds).
332. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690.
333. Complaint, supra note 289, at 6. Precedent counsels against forcing a
student to choose between his religious beliefs and membership in the school
community. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) ("The
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As the complaint notes, "Another student [expressing support for
displaying the Ten Commandments] said, 'This is Giles County and
Christ is a big, big, big part of Giles County. For those who don't like it,
go somewhere else."' 3 34 Although courts ought to be honest enough to
admit that Ten Commandments displays are popular in part because of
exclusionary sentiments, those sentiments should not be persuasive or
given legal imprimatur. 33 5
A third alternative, and the one that courts should choose, is to
invalidate the display based on Allegheny County and McCreary
County.336 According to those cases, the display should be invalidated if
it has "the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion" 3 37 and thus excludes
individuals from the "political community."33 8 Drawing upon Bommai,
courts should evaluate purpose and effect from the perspective of a
student and member of a religious minority who is more likely to feel
marginalized by seemingly religious government action.33 9 The Giles
County school board posted the contested display after citizens
Constitution ... demands that the school may not force this difficult choice [between
participating in school activities and avoiding offense from unwanted religion] upon
these students for '[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require
one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting
conformance to state-sponsored religious practice."' (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 596 (1992))).
334. Complaint, supra note 289, at 5; cf. G. Vazirani, supra note 250, at 287
("[T]here is but one India, and ... this India, and its entire population, Hindu or
Muslim, can identify itself only with Rama and not with Babar [whose general
supposedly built the mosque at Ayodhya].").
335. See Church and State, supra note 5, at 2206.
336. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
337. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
338. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860.
339. See S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 2003; cf
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) ("Regardless of the
listener's support for, or objection to, the message, an objective Santa Fe High
School student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as
stamped with her school's seal of approval." (emphasis added)). In some settings, an
evangelical Christian might feel that he is a minority. Even if a Ten Commandments
display would make that student feel that he is more welcome in the school, that
display would still be an unacceptable instance of "tak[ing] sides" in a religious
debate. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860.
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advocated for it precisely because of its Christian nature.34 To a
reasonable student, especially one who is part of a non-Christian
minority and more sensitive to the Ten Commandments' religious
elements,341 the intense advocacy for the display and its genesis in a
pastor's donation would suggest the school's endorsement of
Christianity.342 When the reasoning of McCreary County and Allegheny
is applied from an appropriate perspective, the display is
unconstitutional.343
Resolving ambiguities of perspective against the display would
reflect the common sense notion that the Ten Commandments are more
religious than secular,344 and reaffirm that displays' purpose and effect
should be evaluated by the Lemon test as articulated by Justice O'Connor
and subsequently refined. 345 Analysis of purpose and effect should still
include the concepts of the religious and the secular because of the
concepts' precedential ubiquity. Moreover, requiring the government
to present actions as secular-based on common values that do not
depend on transcendent, divine ideals-will promote social structures
that in turn protect the independence of both religion and the political
community.347 If the secular and the religious are to be more than fig
340. Complaint, supra note 289, at 3-5.
341. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam).
342. See Complaint, supra note 289, at 3-5; cf Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 108 (1968) (concluding "that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is
the law's reason for existence" based on evidence such as advertisement run in favor
of statute); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.Supp.2d 707, 728 (M.D. Pa.
2005) ("An objective student is also presumed to know that the Dover School Board
advocated for the curriculum change and disclaimer in expressly religious terms, that
the proposed curriculum change prompted massive community debate over the
Board's attempts to inject religious concepts into the science curriculum, and that the
Board adopted the [intelligent design] Policy in furtherance of an expressly religious
agenda... ."). .
343. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860; Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
592-94.
344. See, e.g., Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
345. See Choper, supra note 86, at 504-08.
346. See supra Part I.
347. See TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS
OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 28 (1993) ("It may be a happy accident that
this effort of defining religion converges with the liberal demand in our time that it
be kept quite separate from politics, law, and science-spaces in which verities of
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leaves, claims that the government is acting only to inform people about
history or other ostensibly secular categories should receive less
348deference than they do at present. When judges respond to the
common sense notion that the Ten Commandments, cr~ches, and other
such objects are religious, judges will have to confront unspoken social
norms about what is religious.349 Judges ought to presume that displays
of the Ten Commandments have an impermissibly religious purpose and
effect,so lest they ignore genuine religious motivations or alienate people
who want to participate in public life without reminders of religious
difference. Whether in India or the United States, a welcoming and
inclusive community cannot be centered on objects and places that many
people know are a source of conflict.352
PART IV: WITH A TwIST OF LEMON
The Supreme Court has given the country bewildering
applications of the Establishment Clause. According to Lynch and Van
power and reason articulate our distinctively modem life. This definition is at once
part of a strategy (for secular liberals) of the confinement, and (for liberal Christians)
of the defense of religion.").
348. See Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 540 ("As the
doctrine of religious symbolism currently stands, the judge is left to decide
essentially in a vacuum what the social meaning of a display is and whether that
social meaning is sufficient to trigger Establishment Clause concerns . . . . Not only
does this lack of guidance render decisionmaking more difficult, it also masks the
substantive judgments that are really at work when a judge decides, purportedly as a
question of law, what the message of a display is.").
349. See id.
350. See id at 539; Church and State, supra note 5, at 2206; Ceremonial
Deism, supra note 5, at 769. If schools and other institutions want to use the Ten
Commandments in activities such as reading the relevant portions of Exodus as
literature that does not command a devotional response, that might be permissible.
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam) ("This is not a case in
which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where the
Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like.").
351. See Church and State, supra note 5, at 2194, 2206 (arguing that the
motives of those wanting to display objects such as crosses and the Ten
Commandments on government property are religious, and that the presence of such
objects reduces some people's inclusion in political life).
352. See id. at 2206; VAN DER VEER, supra note 27, at 9-11.
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Orden, placing objects in a historical context either physically or
rhetorically is a viable defense against claims of a religious purpose.353
Yet Stone, Allegheny, and McCreary County did not defer to supposedly
secular contexts. 354 The Court's religious-secular categorization that
underlies all of the cases discussed above allows governments to defend
displays that some Americans think of as religious 35 5 and some find
356
alienating. Real religious motives and origins are obscured even as
their divisive effects remain.3 57  Current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is ripe for a change.3
Seeing courts elsewhere struggle with religion in the public
sphere reveals that the way forward requires modifying Lemon. When
the Supreme Court of India was confronted with a clearly religious
purpose, it asked the same basic question that the purpose and effect
prongs of Lemon ask: did government actors have, or appear to have, a
religious purpose that would exclude citizens from political life? 9
Despite claims of a secular goal, the Supreme Court of India recognized
that building a temple to Rama was divisively religious.360 The lesson for
American courts is that appeals to history or national identity should not
353. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682-83 (2005) (plurality opinion);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-85 (1984).
354. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41; Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 596-
602 (1989); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 870-73 (2005).
355. See Frosty, Save This Honorable Court, supra note 107, at A6 (arguing
that the Establishment Clause does not prevent public religious expression such as
the County of Allegheny's display).
356. Complaint, supra note 289, at 6.
357. See ASAD, supra note 347, at 53 ("Religious symbols ... cannot be
understood independently of their historical relations with nonreligious symbols or
of their articulations in and of social life, in which work and power are always
crucial."); Church and State, supra note 5, at 2194; Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5,
at 746-48.
358. See Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 4, at 493.
359. Compare S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 2003
("[R]eligious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups and protection of
their life and property and of the places of their worship are an essential part of
secularism enshrined in our Constitution."), with McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860
("When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of
advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official
religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible
object is to take sides.").
360. See S. R. Bommai, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at 1998-99.
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361be taken at face value. Underneath seemingly milquetoast, vacuous
prayers, for example, are polarizing debates about American identity and
362
religion. The First Amendment is meant to keep the state from using
religion to leave anyone out of the political community.3
School Board of Giles County36 is a chance for courts to clarify
the proper application of the Establishment Clause. The Lemon test gives
a useful framework to ask about a government action's purpose, its
effect, and the possibility for impermissible government involvement in
365
religion. With the addition of a presumption that seemingly religious
objects reflect an impermissible governmental purpose and effect,366 and,
if those objects are placed in schools, the adoption of the perspective of a
student in a religious minority, 3 the test can prevent government actions
that endorse or distort the meanings of religious symbols venerated by
368
some and found offensive by others. For any country that wants both a
vibrant religious life and a welcoming ethos for its varied citizens, the
jurisprudential recipe can include a Lemon, but only with a twist.
361. See Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 747-48.
362. See, e.g., id. at 763 (noting that Congressional prayer. "has been mired in
controversy from its inception" contrary to the Court's assertion in Marsh v.
Chambers).
363. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Church and State, supra note 5, at 2206.
364. No. 7:11-cv-00435-MFU (W. D. Va. filed Sept. 13, 2011).
365. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
366. See Ceremonial Deism, supra note 5, at 769; Putting Religious Symbolism
in Context, supra note 4, at 540; Marshall, supra note 5, at 549.
367. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).
368. See, e.g., Church and State, supra note 5, at 2206; Ceremonial Deism,
supra note 5, at 724 n.85; Marshall, supra note 5, at 535.
